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We have inorganically increased the use of web applications to the point of using 
them for almost everything and making them an essential part of our everyday lives. As a 
result, the enhancement of privacy and security policies for the web applications is 
becoming increasingly essential. The importance and stateless nature of the web 
infrastructure made the web a preferred target of attacks. The current web access control 
system is a reason behind the victory of attacks. The current web consists of two major 
components, the browser and the server, where the effective access control system needs 
to be implemented. In terms of an access control system, the current web has adopted the 
inadequate same origin policy and same session policy for the browser and server, 
respectively. The current web access control system policies are sufficient for the earlier 
day‟s web, which became inadequate to address the protection needs of today‟s web. 
In order to protect the web application from un-trusted contents, we provide an 
enhanced browser based access control system by enabling the dynamic scoping. Our 
security model for the browser will allow the client and trusted web application contents 
to share a common library and protect web contents from each other, while they still get 
executed at different trust levels. We have implemented a working model of an enhanced 
browser based access control system in Java, under the Lobo browser.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is a global system of interconnected computer networks that uses the 
standard Internet protocol suite to serve billions of users worldwide [29]. It allows us to 
provide easy and efficient communication between any place in the world, work from 
remote locations, locate and retrieve the useful information within seconds, and access 
services and entertainment via World Wide Web (Web). It is a very common mistake for 
most people to treat the terms “Internet” and „World Wide Web” as interchangeable. The 
words “Internet” and “World Wide Web” are not the same thing but related things. The 
Internet is a global network of networks. In contrast, the Web is one of the applications 
that run on the Internet. For example, the Internet is a restaurant and the Web is the most 
popular dish on the menu.  
The volume of traffic moving over the Internet, as well as corporate networks, is 
expanding exponentially every day. It is estimated that there are over 2.26 billion people 
worldwide with Internet access as of December 31, 2011 [1].  While communication 
companies contend frantically to bring faster transmissions into homes, and with the 
Internet evolving to deliver new forms of services and entertainment, many experts 
predict that the best is yet to come. 
The Web has a tremendous impact on our personal lives, through which large 
volumes of personal and business communications are taking place. It has now evolved to 
account for large portions of corporate revenue. There was tremendous progress in its 
development since the Web was invented. The current Web is no longer a platform for 
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simple static pages; it has evolved to highly dynamic and interactive ones. The Web is 
indispensable in education, security, modern commerce, entertainment, and social 
interaction. It became a complex delivery platform for sophisticated, distributed 
applications with multifaceted security requirements. Analysts are constantly trying to 
find out the number of web pages available on the Web. However, it is quite impossible 
to analyze. Even by the time they are analyzed, the final number of pages would have 
increased by many thousands, since thousands of pages pour in every minute. Google 
claims to have indexed over a trillion pages as of July 25, 2008 [2]. As of February 27, 
2012, over 139.2 million websites are hosting these web pages [3]. 
1.1 Nature of the web 
The Web is stateless by nature. Stateless protocol is a communication protocol in 
computing, which treats each request as an independent request, even if two requests are 
related to each other. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [5] is the best example of the 
stateless protocol [4]. Web servers are designed to be stateless [28] in nature which uses 
the HTTP for the data communication. It treats or processes each HTTP request by an 
independent process, even if two requests are related to each other. These servers do not 
store any user data during processing the HTTP request. This is in contrast with the 
traditional File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [6] servers, which are stateful. In traditional 
client/server applications, a process will be assigned for each client, until the client 
terminates. All the requests generated by the client are processed by a single process 
respectively. These servers will store the client‟s details during processing each request. 
The main cause for the Web‟s stateless nature is performance. The web servers needed to 
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address the large number of clients than traditional client/server applications, so they do 
not want any process to be tied up with a single client. 
Shopping cart is one of the most common web applications, which requires the 
application to keep track of the items in the cart during the traverses from one page to 
another. This makes most of the web applications to be stateful. The web servers support 
these applications by using session concept. For example, for the Amazon shopping cart 
application, when the web server notices a new user browsing, it assigns a session ID to 
the user which will be stored in the browser cookie. This cookie will be sent along with 
each HTTP request so that the server indentifies the request session. This is how a 
stateless web server will support a stateful application.  
Building stateful applications on the stateless web infrastructure has raised many 
security problems [7]. Furthermore complicating matters, the Web continues to evolve 
with new browser features, protocols and standards added at rapid pace. The 
specifications of new features are often complex, lack of security models and the security 
of the applications is overlooked. As a result, large numbers of vulnerabilities and 
security threats are raised for the web applications. 
1.2 Contents of the web 
Web had been designed for serving static contents; initially, this originated from a 
single trusted source. It has now evolved into quite dynamic contents and requests 
derived from multiple sources with varying levels of trustworthiness. Contents may be 
included by the Web itself, derived from user supplied text or from partially third parties. 
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Web contents are divided into three types based on the varying levels of trustworthiness 
[7]. 
1.2.1 Trusted contents 
The contents which are originated from the web application itself are considered 
as trusted contents. Trustworthiness of these contents depends on the nature of the 
application and the procedure followed by the application developer. For example, to 
update status, to write on a wall, to ask a question, to add photos or videos and confirm 
friend requests on Facebook, all of these are the trusted contents which are generated and 
maintained by the Facebook application. 
1.2.2 Untrusted contents 
Many web applications now include the user provided contents such as blogs, 
comments, feedback, user profiles, etc., in their pages. These contents are the third-party 
data and less trustworthy than the first-party contents generated by the web application 
itself. For example, untrusted contents include advertisements and fake profiles in social 
networks like Facebook and Orkut. The current web, due to its stateless nature, cannot 
restrict in assigning access privileges to the contents based on their trustworthiness. 
1.2.3 Partially trusted contents 
Many web applications allow extensions to their pages i.e., they include the links 
to third-party programs or directly include third-party programs in their pages and run 
those programs in the browser. For example, third-party applications like CastleVille are 
embedded in a user‟s Facebook page, which will collect information from a user‟s 
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account and run on the third-party application servers. These contents can be dangerous if 
they are vulnerable or malicious. 
 
 
           Figure 1: Example for different types of web contents 
Figure 1  shows the Facebook application with different types of web contents. If 
these contents are not carefully handled, malicious code can be injected into the web 
application. However, Facebook has its own mechanism to handle these contents without 
any security issues. 
1.3 Attacks on web        
The Web, due to its importance and stateless nature has become a preferred target 
of attacks. Web attacks are apparently more serious when they are inflicted upon 
businesses that store sensitive data, such as personal, military, confidential, medical, 
governmental, and financial records. The consequences of attacks on any entity range 
from mildly inconvenient to completely debilitating. According to the Norton 
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Cybercrime Report 2011 [8], the total cost of cybercrime is at $388 billion per year, 
which includes $114 billion in direct theft and time spent resolving attacks, plus another 
$274 billion for productive time victims lost due to cybercrimes being committed against 
them.  
The top ten web attacks according to the OWSAP Top 10, 2007 [9] are 
1. Cross Site Scripting (XSS). 
2. Injection Flaws. 
3. Malicious File Execution. 
4. Insecure Direct Object Reference. 
5. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF). 
6. Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling. 
7. Broken Authentication and Session Management. 
8. Insecure Cryptographic Storage. 
9. Insecure Communications. 
10. Failure to Restrict URL Access. 
Most of the Web vulnerabilities appear to be caused by the mistakes made during 
the design and development of the application by the developer. However, when we take 
a deep look at the architecture and functionalities of the Web, we come to the conclusion 
that the main cause for web vulnerabilities is the access control system of the Web, not 
the developer. 
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1.3.1 Access control system 
Access control system refers to a security enforcement model that has the ability 
to decide who can do what to whom in a system. Access control system consists of three 
components: principals, objects and the access control model. Principals (who) are the 
entities in the system that can manipulate resources. Objects (whom) are the resources in 
the system that require controlled access. The access control model tells how decisions 
are made in the system. For example, consider an online exam application for school. 
Alice is a professor who teaches CS600 and wants to conduct an online exam for 
students. To avoid plagiarism, she designed an exam pattern in such a way that each 
student will get his or her own exam paper based on their ID numbers i.e., Bob with ID 
number 1 will get paper set 1 and John with ID number 21 gets paper set 21. Here the 
access control system comes into play, which decides who can do what to whom in a 
system. When the students login to the application with their ID numbers, the access 
control system first checks their ID numbers, and then assigns the exam paper to each 
student respectively. 
1.3.2 Web components 
The current web consists of two major components, the browser and the server, 
where the effective access control system needs to be implemented. In terms of access 
control system, the current web has adopted the inadequate same origin policy (SOP) and 
same session policy (SSP) for the browser and server respectively. This was sufficient for 
the earlier day‟s web, which became inadequate to address the protection needs of 
today‟s web. Web applications that embed third party content in their web pages cannot 
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restrict the permissions of the third party code due to the failures of the access control 
system. In order to overcome this fundamental problem, we have developed an enhanced 
browser based access control system by enabling dynamic scoping. The objective of our 
work is to make the access control system address the current web content problems, 
which will allow the client and trusted web application contents to share the common 
library and protect web contents from each other, while they still get executed at different 
trust levels.                  
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CHAPTER 2: THE PURPOSE FOR PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT 
This chapter describes the drawbacks of the current access control system and 
need of its enhancement. The access control system has been implemented on web 
components, browsers and servers, by adopting the same origin policy (SOP) and the 
same session policy (SSP) respectively. 
2.1 Same origin policy 
The same origin policy (SOP) is also called single origin policy. SOP prevents 
documents or scripts loaded from one origin from getting or setting properties of a 
document from a different origin. It also allows scripts running on pages originating from 
the same site to access each other‟s methods and properties with no specific restrictions 
[10]. The term “origin” is defined as a combination of the domain name, protocol and 
port number of the HTML document. Two documents or scripts are considered to be of 
the same origin if and only if all these values are exactly the same. For instance, 
http://www.abc.com/jobs.html and http://www.abc.com/price.html belong to the same 
origin, but http://www.xyz.com/jobs.html and http://www.abc.com/jobs.html don‟t 
belong to the same origin as they had different domains. Similarly, 
http://www.abc.com/jobs.html and https://www.abc.com/price.html don‟t belong to the 
same origin as they had different protocols. 
The following example will illustrate the importance of the same origin policy of 
a browser. Assume that you are logged into Facebook and visit a malicious website in 
another browser tab. Without the same origin policy, JavaScript on a malicious website 
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could do anything to your Facebook account. For example, the hacker could read private 
messages, post status updates, and change security questions. In Figure 2, www.abc.com 
can access the contents of the www.facebook.com the user page. 
In order to avoid this illegal access to Facebook, it is important for the browser to 
detect trusted and untrusted Java Scripts to access Facebook resources. That's where the 
same origin policy comes into play. If the JavaScript is included in Facebook HTML 
page, it may access facebook.com resources; otherwise it cannot access facebook.com 
resources. 
 
                      Figure 2: Without same origin policy                  
In Figure 3 www.abc.com cannot access the contents of the www.facebook.com 
user page due to the same origin policy. Privileges should be assigned to contents based 
on the trustworthiness even if they belong to the same origin and this is indispensable in 
the current web. Cross Site Scripting (XXS) [11] is one of the side effects of the same 
origin policy 
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                             Figure 3: With same origin policy                     
2.1.1 Cross Site Scripting (XXS) 
Cross Site Scripting attack is an injection type of attack that takes advantage of 
website vulnerability in which the site displays content that includes un-sanitized user-
provided data. XSS allows the user to inject a malicious code into trusted websites, which 
provides attackers a way to bypass client-side security mechanisms (i.e., same origin 
policy) normally imposed on the web content by modern web browsers. On the 
successful injection of the code, the attacker can gain elevated access privileges to the 
entire page based on the same origin policy, i.e., scripts running on pages originating 
from the same site are allowed to access each other‟s methods and properties without 
considering trustworthiness of contents. 
For instance, a victim website which allows users to create communities with 
their own rules, ranks, chat boards and polls. These communities may be designed with 
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images, graphics, animations and text to make their community look better and more fit 
the theme. For example, a community that protests against a war might be designed with 
pictures of recent wars and their consequences. The attacker can inject a malicious code 
in to the victim website while creating the user communities. As a malicious code 
originating from the same site, it has access to other scripts or contents in the page based 
on the same origin policy. 
On successful injection of a malicious code and browsing of attackers 
communities by users, the attacker can take control of user accounts and either use a 
malicious code to automatically manipulate the user accounts, such as forcing the user to 
post comments or join the community whether they want to or not, or stealing the credit 
card and private information. This could also be used to redirect the user to websites that 
places virii, spyware, adware, or other malicious content on computer. 
 
                               Figure 4: Illustrate XSS Attack 
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The cause of this attack is due to the inadequacy of current same origin policy 
which cannot provide the security based on the trustworthiness of current web page 
contents. Figure 4 will illustrate the sequence of actions performed by XSS attack. 
2.2 Same session policy 
Similarly, on the server side access control is primarily based on the same session 
policy. When a user logs into a web application, the server creates a dedicated session for 
this user, separating him or her from the other users. Sessions are implemented using 
session cookies; as long as a request carries a session cookie, it will be given all the 
privileges associated with that session. Namely within each session, all requests are given 
the same privileges, regardless of whether they are initiated by first-party or third-party 
contents. In the current access control system, it is difficult to allow the request from the 
same web page to access the same session, while preventing some of them from invoking 
certain server-side services [12]. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [13] is one of the 
side effects of the same session policy. 
2.2.1 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
Cross Site Request Forgery is also known as the one-click attack, sea surf attack 
or confused deputy attack. CSRF is a type of attack on a website in which an intruder 
masquerades as a legitimate and trusted user. A  CSRF attack can be executed by stealing 
the identity of an existing user and then hacking into a web server using that identity. An 
attacker can masquerade as a legitimate user by sending HTTP requests that return 
sensitive user data to the intruder.  CSRF exploits the trust that a site has in a user's 
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browser where as XSS exploits the trust a user has for a particular site [14]. CSRF uses 
the vulnerabilities in same session policy to perform an attack successfully, i.e., requests 
or actions which are originating from the same session will be given the same privileges 
regardless of whether they are originated from first party or third party contents.  
 
                          Figure 5: Illustrate CSRF Attack                
A real world example of this is the ability of attackers to commandeer certain 
banking websites. The required steps to gain ownership and perform fraudulent financial 
transaction are shown in the following example: 
1. Once a user logs into an online banking account, the banking server 
assigns a session to the user. 
2. Before the session expires or the user logs off from the banking 
account, he or she surfs the internet by opening a new tab in the 
browser. 
3.  The website surfed by the user contains a hidden code. User browsing 
activates the code and sends a HTML request to the bank web server 
with authentication details from browser cookies.  
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4. So the attacker can make fraudulent transaction to his or her account. 
This attack will be successful only when the request is made from a session. 
Figure 5 will illustrate the sequence of actions performed by a CSRF attack. 
2.3 Failure to support design principles 
Both the same origin policy and the same session policy failed to fulfill the 
fundamentals proposed by Saltzer and Schroeder [15] in “The Protection of Information 
in Computer Systems”. Separation of privilege and least privilege are the two of eight 
design principles summarized by Saltzer and Schroeder, which are violated by the current 
web access control system polices. In order to provide efficient security on the Web, the 
following two principles must be supported by current web access control system. 
2.3.1 Separation of privilege 
According to the principle of a separation of privilege, privileges in a system 
should be divided into less powerful privileges, such that no single accident or breach of 
trust is sufficient to compromise the protected information. For instance, this principle is 
most commonly used in the banking system for bank safety deposit boxes, where two 
physical keys are needed to lock and unlock the boxes. Once the box is locked, two keys 
are separated and maintained, one by a user and another by the bank manager to avoid 
unauthorized access due to loss of keys. 
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2.3.2 Least privilege 
According to the principle of least privilege, each user in the system should be 
least privileged to complete their jobs without any interruption based on their 
trustworthiness. For instance, in UNIX the normal user should not be given the privileges 
of a root user unless they are required for its legitimate purpose.  
The current web access control systems are inadequate to address the protection 
needs of today‟s web because it is violating the above mentioned design principles. So 
there is need for redesigning the access control system of the Web to provide efficient 
security. We have enhanced the access control system of the Web by enabling the 
dynamic scoping for the browser, which overcomes the inadequacies in the same origin 
and the same session policies and also provides support for the Saltzer and Schroeder 
design principles.  
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               CHAPTER 3: RELATED WORK 
The need for enhancing the fine-grained access control system for the Web has 
been recognized earlier by many researchers. A number of approaches are proposed by 
researchers in two ways: either to modify the browser or rewrite the entire script, which 
can be done either statically or dynamically. 
By using the iframe [16], we can easily isolate the third-party contents or script by 
putting them in the iframe from the host page. Scripts included in the iframe will be 
considered as originating from the different origin, so those scripts cannot access any 
script or contents in the host domain. This will have a severe effect on the web 
application‟s functionality. To avoid this all-or-nothing model, several solutions were 
proposed for a browser-based access control system. 
Crites et al.‟s proposed Mashup solutions [24]. Mashup solutions brought a policy 
that abandons the same origin policy by allowing the integrator to specify public and 
private data including DOM access. Completely abandoning the SOP would require a 
significant change to websites. This is going to be expensive work. 
To avoid completely abandoning the SOP, Miller proposed a Caja method [25]. 
This approach is based on a concept of rewriting the program source code to enforce the 
security policies. The rewriting procedure of Caja is very complicated and cannot always 
preserve original script functionality. 
In contrast to Caja, Barth et al.‟s isolated world mechanism [23] replaces the one-
to-one context mapping with a one-to-many map where each context maintains a 
 18 
 
mapping table to the DOM elements of the host page. This ensures that only host objects 
are shared among all worlds but not native or custom objects. We have adopted this 
isolated world mechanism idea to isolate the contents‟ execution.  
Zhou and Evans proposed a solution [26] in extension to isolated world 
mechanism. It is a one-way trust model with a goal to protect user content from untrusted 
scripts rather than to protect embedded scripts from the host page or each other. This 
approach doesn‟t consider the JavaScript frameworks like jQuery and other attacks like 
cross site scripting, which are very important to provide the security to web applications. 
This fine-grained access control system aims to protect the trusted content from the 
untrusted content, but not to protect the contents from each other.  
Du et al.‟s proposed SCUTA [12]. It is based on the ESCUDO [27], which was 
their earlier work in protecting privacy for web applications. SCUTA uses the new 
concept called sub-session for web applications, which is based on the ring concept in the 
ESCUDO, so the requests from trusted client-side contents can be separated from those 
of untrusted contents; such a separation enables web applications to enforce a fine-
grained access control system. This approach provides security measures against various 
attacks like cross site scripting, which are not addressed in the Zhou and Evans approach. 
 In both solutions, the JavaScript code in different worlds or rings will not interact 
with each other. In a real world application, especially in many social networking sites, it 
would be ideal that the hosting applications have the capability to provide a shared 
library, which can be used by third party users. Based on this observation, we propose to 
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use the origin of the function call, instead of the location of the function, to decide the 
privileges of the JavaScript code. 
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CHAPTER 4:TWO-WAY SECURITY MODEL 
The objective of our work is to make the access control system address the current 
web content problems. The proposed approach will allow the client and trusted web 
application contents to share the common library and protect web contents from each 
other by executing at different trust levels. We assume a two-way security model since 
our goal is to protect web contents from each other and allow sharing the common library 
among the web contents. 
We need to make fundamental changes to the current web protection model to 
address the protection needs of modern applications. The two-way security model can be 
obtained by enabling dynamic scoping for the current web access control system. The 
two-way security model doesn‟t target in changing the today‟s web architecture but 
focuses on fundamental changes to the access control system. 
Our model doesn‟t make any changes to the basic policies of current access 
control system but enhances it with dynamic scoping, i.e., our model will use the existing 
same origin and same session policies without any changes. Our model allows the 
developer to configure their application by appropriately specifying the shared library 
and other contents with their trustworthiness. Web applications communicate the 
configuration to the web browser, where the proposed access control model enforces 
access decisions based on the configuration. Figure 6 will illustrate our two-way security 
model. 
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1. Let us consider Group 1 and Group 2 are the client and trusted contents, and the 
shared library is a collection of some trusted contents. 
2. The application developer specifies the shared library and other contents with 
their trustworthiness to the browser. 
3. Group 1 and Group 2 can access (read-only access) shared library but cannot 
manipulate it, i.e., Group 1 and Group 2 can get the resources from the shared 
library and use them, but cannot make any changes to the shared library. This 
proposal is based on a very simple principle: If one would like to manipulate his 
own work, it is allowed to proceed; if one would like to manipulate something 
outside his work, the actions will be prohibited. 
4. Group 1 and Group 2 cannot access each other. 
                                    
 
                                Figure 6: Two-way security model 
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 In modern web applications, different web contents are needed to access each 
other to perform their task successfully. The complete isolation of contents will not fit for 
modern web applications, so there is a need for the web applications to share some 
common things among the web contents irrespective of trustworthiness. To avoid the 
burden and complexities in defining relationships among the web contents and protecting 
them from each other, our model defines the shared library and allows web contents to 
access them. To differentiate and designate the trustworthiness of different components in 
a web application, we introduce the group concept for different components in a web 
page. This concept is very similar to the ring concept in SCUTA. The key difference is 
that the defining access control is based on where the JavaScript code is initiated, not 
where the code is located.  
Our two-way security model places all the web contents in different groups based 
on their trustworthiness except the shared library. Shared library contents are placed in 
the default group. Our model allows web developers to choose the total number of groups 
that fit their application needs. The number of groups for one application is independent 
from others.  
This two-way security model can be achieved by enforcing dynamic scoping for 
web based access control system. In computer programming, scope is the range within a 
computer program in which a variable name or other identifier is valid and can be used, 
or within which a declaration has effect. Computer programming has two different types 
of scoping: they are static and dynamic scoping.  
 23 
 
Static scope is determined at compile time by the compiler using a sequential 
processing of program and remains the same throughout the program. Static scoping 
determines the occurrence of an identifier by first checking the local block in which the 
name appears, then the block construct that declares the block (i.e., its static parent). This 
process is repeated until a definition is found. That is, the compiler first searches 
(searching for variable or identifier) in the local function (the function which is running 
now), then searches in the function  in which that function was defined, then searches in 
the function in which that function was defined, and so forth until a definition is found. 
By default C, C++ and JavaScript uses static scoping.  
In contrast, dynamic scoping is determined at runtime. In dynamic scoping, 
processing of program statements follows the execution order of different statements and 
can change during the execution of the program. Dynamic scoping determines the 
definition for an occurrence of the identifier or a variable by examining the calling 
sequence, rather than the program block declaration hierarchy as in static scoping. That 
is, the search for identifier starts first in local function, then search in the function 
that called the local function, then search in the function that called that function, and so 
on, up the call stack until the definition is found. "Dynamic" refers to change, in that the 
call stack can be different every time a given function is called, and so the function might 
hit different variables depending on where it is called from. Figure 7 will illustrate the 
difference between the static and dynamic scoping. 
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  Figure 7: Difference between static and dynamic scoping. 
1. Bob‟s function returns the 15 by fetching value from its lexically 
enclosing scope i.e. a=10, when it is called directly. The Function Alice() 
which calls Bob(), returns different values in static and dynamic scoping. 
2. In static scoping the function, Alice () calls Bob (), which fetches the 
variable “a” value from its lexically enclosing scope i.e., a=10 and 
returns 15. 
3. In dynamic scoping the function, Alice () calls Bob (), which fetches the 
variable “a” value from the initiated function i.e., a=20 and returns 25. 
Execution of JavaScript requires a scope for top-level script variable storage as 
well as a place to find standard objects like function and object. Calls to functions in 
JavaScript use static scope, which means that variables are first looked up in the function 
and then, if not found there, in the lexically enclosing scope. This causes problems if 
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functions you define in your shared library need access to variables you define in your 
instance scope as illustrated in Figure 7. For better understanding of how scoping affects 
functionalities of shared library consider Bob() as shared library function and Alice() as 
initiated function in Figure 7. Therefore our two-way security model can be achieved 
only by enforcing dynamic scoping for web based access control system. 
In order to get better understanding of our two-way security model, we use the 
more complete example shown in   Figure 8 to demonstrate working of our model. In this 
example, shared library contains variables a=6, b=9, and functions product(), and reset(). 
The product()  function calculates and returns the product of two numbers. The reset() 
function will manipulate the contents of documents such as making the document empty 
or setting different values to the variables. The remaining scripts are grouped into group1 
and group2 according to their trustworthiness.  
Group1 contains the variables a=1, b=2, and a call to the product() function in the 
shared library. The product() function initiated from group1 will fetch values of the 
variables a and b from the group1, and returns 2 rather than 54.  
Group2 contains the variables a=1, b=2, and a call to the reset() and product() 
functions in the shared library. The product() function initiated from group2 will fetch 
values of the variables a and b from the group1 and returns 2 rather than 54. When the 
dynamic scoping is used, DOM root is the root of scripts scope that initiates the function 
rather than the scripts which contain the function. The reset() function initiated from 
group2, will manipulate the contents of group2 only, not the shared library as the 
document root is the root of group2 rather than the root of the shared library.  
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  Figure 8: Complete example demonstrates working of a two-way security model 
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CHAPTER 5: EFFECTUATION OF TWO-WAY SECURITY MODEL 
This chapter describes a prototype implementation of the two-way security model 
on the Lobo browser [17] based on the requirements and design presented in Chapter 4. 
The Lobo open source project aims to develop an extensible browser and RIA platform 
written completely in Java that not only supports HTML and JavaScript, but also enables 
rendering of arbitrary Rich Internet Application (RIA) languages [18]. The Lobo browser 
is built on the Cobra HTML Rendering engine, which is a pure Java HTML renderer and 
DOM parser that is being developed to support HTML 4, JavaScript and CSS 2. Cobra 
uses the Rhino 1.6R5 JavaScript engine, which is released by the Mozilla Foundation 
[19].  
5.1 Lobo Architecture 
The architecture of the Lobo browser which we derived is shown in Figure 9 
[20]. Lobo is intended to be a platform for building new client-side web languages. 
Therefore, the browser architecture is designed to be easily extensible. It comprises 
five major subsystems plus the dependencies between them.  
5.1.1 User Interface 
The User Interface subsystem is the layer between the user and the browser 
engine. It provides features such as toolbars, page services, navigation, preferences, 
and printing. It may be integrated with the desktop environment to provide browser 
session management or communication with other desktop applications. 
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                     Figure 9: Architecture of Lobo browser     
5.1.2 Browser Engine  
The Browser Engine subsystem is an embeddable component that provides a 
high-level interface to the rendering engine. It consists of three important 
components: the Request Engine, Extensions Manager, and Cache Manager. User 
requests are forwarded to the servers by the Request Engine from the user 
interface. The Request Engine uses the Extensions Manager to choose an 
appropriate extension to render the response. The Extensions Manager uses the 
Cobra HTML Rendering Engine for rendering web pages. The Cache Manager is 
responsible for caching responses  based on the instructions specified in the 
HTTP cache-control header. The Request Engine interacts or contacts with the 
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Cache Manager before issuing a network request, and serves the response from 
the cache if possible. 
5.1.3 Cobra HTML Rendering Engine 
The Cobra HTML Rendering Engine subsystem is a pure Java HTML 
renderer and DOM parser that produces a visual representation for a given URL. It is 
capable of displaying HTML and Extensible Markup Language documents, styled 
with CSS, as well as embedded content such as images. It consists of five major 
components, which are HTML parser, Layout or Graphics Engine, Document Object 
Model (DOM), Window and XMLHttpRequest objects. Cobra uses the HTML 
parser, which can be used independently of the Cobra HTML Rendering Engine to 
parse the web page to page and construct a DOM tree corresponding to the page. 
Each web page is assigned a distinct DOM and a Window, which is an abstraction of 
the window in which the web page is displayed. The XMLHttpRequest object is used 
by JavaScript programs to send HTTP requests. The Layout or Graphics Engine is 
used to render the graphic contents of web pages. 
 5.1.4 Rhino JavaScript Interpreter  
Cobra uses the Rhino 1.6R5 JavaScript engine, which is released by the Mozilla 
Foundation [19]. Rhino JavaScript interpreter executes JavaScript code, which may be 
embedded in web pages. Rhino doesn‟t contain any objects or methods for manipulating 
HTML documents but it is only an implementation of core language [21].  
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Rhino includes the following features [21] 
1. All the features of JavaScript 1.5 
2. Allows direct scripting of Java 
3. A JavaScript shell for executing JavaScript scripts 
4. A JavaScript compiler to transform JavaScript source files into 
Java class files. 
5.1.5 Object Wrapper 
The Rhino JavaScript Interpreter accesses the DOM, Window, and 
XMLHttpRequest objects via the Object Wrapper. All the requests to the three objects are 
mediated through Object Wrapper. 
5.2 Identifying subsystems of the Lobo browser architecture for 
implementation 
This section describes the identification of the subsystems of Lobo browser 
architecture to make modification for enforcement of two-way security model. JavaScript 
is a dynamic scripting language, which is one of the sources for the attackers to violate 
the security policies of web page. In Lobo browser, JavaScript is parsed by HTML parser 
and executed by the Rhino JavaScript engine. Rhino was completely written in Java and 
enforces its own security policies. It is very important to understand the terms context 
and scopes in Rhino.  
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The Rhino context object is used to store thread-specific information about the 
execution environment [22]. A thread executing JavaScript should be associated with 
only one context.  
Execution of JavaScript requires a scope to find a place where it can access and 
store the variables or objects. In Rhino it is important to understand that scope is 
independent of context that created it, i.e., creating a scope for JavaScript can be done 
using one context and executing the script using that scope and different context is 
allowed. 
Rhino follows the same origin policy, which assigns the privileges based on the 
origin. Rhino provides the ability to keep track of the origin of a code in webpage. Rhino 
provides a security-channel to enforce its security features in web application. The 
security channel needs to do two things. 
First, every context that is created must be supplied an instance of an object that 
implements the SecuritySupport interface. This will provide Rhino the support 
functionality it needs to perform security-related tasks [21]. 
Second, the value of the property security.requireSecurityDomain should be 
changed to true in the resource bundle org.mozila.javascript.resources.Security. The 
value of this property can be determined at runtime by calling the 
isSecurityDomainRequired method of context. Setting this property to true requires that 
any calls that compile or evaluate JavaScript must supply a security domain object of any 
object type that will be used to identify JavaScript code [21]. 
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 The security-channel provided by Rhino will be sufficient for overcoming the 
current web access control drawbacks; by implementing our two-way security model 
without any modifications to the current security policy of Rhino. We need to make 
modification to the Cobra HTML Rendering Engine subsystem rather than the Rhino 
engine security features to implement the two-way security model. 
5.3 Two-way security model implementation 
This section describes a prototype implementation of a two-way security model 
on the Lobo browser. Our two-way security model implementation was involved in 
adding or modifying approximately 900 lines of code to the Cobra HTML Rendering 
Engine. We did not make any modification to the Rhino JavaScript engine security 
features. Hence, our implementation can be used with any pure Java based web browser 
that uses the Rhino JavaScript engine. Our implementation involved two phases: 
1. Extracting and Tracking security groups. 
2. Enforcing access control policy. 
5.3.1 Extracting and Tracking security groups 
This phase deals with the Extracting and Tracking security groups of two-way 
security model. Whenever web application or page is called from Lobo web browser, 
Cobra HTML Rendering Engine parser parses the web page and constructs the DOM 
objects. We have modified the Lobo browser to recognize a new attribute group in script 
tags. During this process our two-way security model extracts the security group from 
script tags and stores it in the DOM elements for the respective HTML tags. If a group 
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element is not found in the script tags our model assigns a default group to that content. 
The contents with a default group are categorized as shared contents. It is the 
responsibility of the developer to configure their application with different security 
groups. 
 Two-way security model tracks the security groups during the execution of 
scripts. It maintains a webpage-specific table, which is used for maintaining security 
groups of current executing web contents. Our model dynamically updates the table 
according to the flow of execution.  Our model does not make any changes to the order of 
parsing and execution of the web contents. Normally, the parsing and execution of the 
web contents will be done in the order of their appearance and dependencies on the web 
page. The common processing work of the Cobra HTML Rendering Engine parser is 
creating DOM elements and adding them to the DOM tree. Some web contents can 
momentarily create HTTP request for accessing other web contents during the processing 
work of the Cobra HTML Rendering Engine. Before answering those requests, our model 
retrieves the security group of HTTP requests content origin from the DOM and updates 
the web-page specific table and then answers the request. As a result the new requests 
generated dynamically can still execute in the origin context. 
5.3.2 Enforcing access control policy 
Two-way security model enforces the access control policy based on principle 
that the contents of web application share the common library and protect from each 
other, while they still get executed at different trust levels. Two-way security model 
enforcement comprises three parts. 
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First, our model isolates all the web contents based on their group values. In order 
to isolate the web contents we adopted the isolated world mechanism idea from Adam 
Barth‟s Protecting Browsers from Extensions Vulnerabilities [23]. The isolated world 
mechanism replaces the one-to-one context mapping with a one-to-many map where each 
context maintains mapping table to the DOM elements of the host page. This ensures that 
only host objects are shared among all worlds, but not native or custom objects. 
We adopted and modified this mechanism to implement the two-way security 
model. Our model creates a separate context for each group. Each time the Rhino 
JavaScript engine is invoked by the Cobra HTML parse to execute JavaScript program, it 
passes the JavaScript context corresponding to the programs group. As a result, 
JavaScript programs belonging to a group can access only the custom and native objects 
that reside in the context belonging to the group. This isolation is necessary to protect the 
web contents from each other. 
Second, our model supports the dynamic scoping and scripting as we are 
enforcing access control policies at runtime. As our model creates separate context for 
each scripts, the dynamically generated scripts will run in different context from the 
scripts that created them. This will break the functionality since variables and functions 
that should be shared are now isolated. We made modifications to the Lobo Browser in 
such a way that dynamically generated scripts will inherit the group from their creator, 
thus executing within the same context. 
Third, our model supports the library sharing by modifying the prototype chain of 
scope and restricting any modification to the shared library by using sealObject() method. 
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Our model enables the sharing of contents by creating a new context and calling scope 
object by setting its setprototype method to sharedscope object and parent to null. Our 
model restricts others making changes to shared library by calling the sealObject method. 
sealObject method will not allow to add or delete properties to the object and make 
changes to the existing objects. Our model assigns the default group to the contents that 
don‟t carry the group element in the script tags. The content with default group is 
categorized as shared library. It is the responsibility of the developer to specify the type 
of content by configuring the web applications. 
We have implemented two phases of the two-way security model without any 
compatibility issues. 
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                                        CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
We strongly believe that the access control system in the current web is 
inadequate to satisfy the protection needs of today‟s web. The web technology is still 
evolving, so a good access control system design should not only be able to satisfy 
today‟s needs, it should also be extensible to satisfy the unknown protection needs that 
will inevitably come up during the technology evolution. So we outlined the two 
characteristics that a security model of the access control system should adapt, to address 
the current web problems and provide support to the security model evolution that 
address the future web problems. We have presented a browser based access control by 
enabling the dynamic scoping. This access control model is systematically designed to 
fulfill the two characteristic requirements using mandatory access-control principles. We 
implemented a prototype of a new browser based access control in the Lobo web browser 
and illustrated how web applications can use this new access control system. 
Future research in browser access control should consider how to facilitate richer 
web applications while enforcing the principle of least privilege. In the future, web 
applications will feature richer and more interactive clients executing in the web browser. 
So the future research should focus on architecture improvements of the Web and design 
of API methods, to facilitate JavaScript programs to enforce the least privilege principle 
of the access control in the richer applications. 
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